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Alan Costall
... traditional theories have separated life from nature, mind
from organic life, and thereby created mysteries. ... Those who
talk most of the organism, physiologists and psychologists, are
often just those who display least sense of the intimate, delica-
te and subtle interdependence of all organic structures and pro-
cesses with one another. The world seems mad in pre-occupa-
tion with what is specific, particular, disconnected in medicine,
politics, science, industry, education. ... To see the organism in
nature, the nervous system in the organism, the brain in the ner-
vous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the pro-
blems which haunt philosophy. And when thus seen they will be
seen to be in, not as marbles are in a box but as events are in
history, in a moving, growing never finished process (John
Dewey, 1958, pp. 278 & 295).
The separation of life from nature
According to the textbooks, René Descartes (1596-1650) has a lot to
answer for. He is supposed to have set up, apparently single-handedly, a
whole range of dualisms that continue to trouble the human sciences: the
physical vs mental, body vs mind (or more precisely, soul), animal vs
human, self vs other, mechanical vs rational, passive vs active, natural vs
normative, to mention just a few. Certainly, Descartes had been impressed
by the scope of the new scheme of physical science and its extension to the
distant heavens, on the one hand, and to the intimacy of our own bodies,
on the other. (He had been particularly struck by William Harvey’s account
of the circulatory system). According to Descartes, the new physics was
nothing less than a comprehensive science of nature. Consequently, any-
thing failing to figure within that science must exist beyond the realm of the
natural (Wilson, 1980, pp. 41-42).
Maybe Descartes does not deserve all the blame. On first reading, at
least, Galileo and Kepler, among others, also seem to have engaged in a
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similar ‘ontological fix’ to save the universal claims for the new physics
(Burt, 1969, Whitehead, 1926; Young, 1966; cf. Chapman, 1966).1 Put
bluntly, the fix amounts to this: the new science explains everything – and
everything it fails to explain is not really real.
Within this scheme, psychology’s own subject – the ‘subject’ – became
radically subjectivized, as that which eludes science. As Alexandre Koyré
has put it:
[Modern science] broke down the barriers that separated the heavens
and the earth ... . [But] it did this by substituting for our world of qual-
ity and sense perception, the world in which we live, and love, and die,
another world – the world of quantity, of reified geometry, a world in
which, though there is a place for everything, there is no place for
man. (Koyré, 1965, p. 24).
This is not just a matter of rather distant history. With regard to modern sci-
ence, Bergman (1973) has asserted that »it is the task of physics to build a
world which is foreign to consciousness and in which consciousness is
obliterated« (cited in Rosen, 2000, p. 82.) But we need to be clear about the
implications of this exclusion of us. First, it is not clear how there could be
any kind of science.  For, after all, despite any claims to the contrary, sci-
entists are people, too, and science is a human enterprise. If they/we do not
belong to the natural order of things, how is science getting done?
But this intellectual scheme also ‘set up’ psychology to be rather an odd
kind of enterprise, the science of the ‘unscientific’, the science of that
which eludes science. Once physical science had promoted its methodolo-
gy (of atomism, mechanism, and quantification) to an exclusive ontology,
psychology (so conceived) was a pretty obvious mistake waiting to be
made – an essentially derivative science modelled on physics, yet having
as its subject the very realm that physics rendered utterly obscure.
Discussions of the history and philosophy of science continue to remain
obsessively fixated upon classical physics, and when psychologists them-
selves worry about the status of their own science, it is, again, classical
physics they usually take as the standard. Yet physics itself has been sub-
ject to fundamental change over the last century (most notably, relativity
theory, and quantum theory), and in a way that has questioned the exclu-
sion of us, though not, however, as a possible object of scientific inquiry,
but – qua scientists – as the practitioners of science itself. But, of course,
earlier, in the nineteenth century, there had already been a development
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within natural science that changed the ground rules of science, and found
a more secure place for people within the natural order of things.
Bringing things to life
Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory broke nearly all the rules, and yet it
came to be accepted as part of natural science. It was non-mathematical,
predominantly non-mechanistic (Costall, 1991), and invoked history and
contingency (Gould, 1989; Landau, 1991). It also involved a remarkable
reconciliation of two seemingly opposed concepts: adaptation and evolu-
tion.
In the eighteenth century, evolutionary theory had come to be associat-
ed with atheism, materialism, and political terror. To challenge evolution-
ism, natural historians (typically clergymen with time on their hands)
sought »evidences of the existence and attributes of the Deity collected
from the appearances of nature« (to quote the subtitle of William Paley’s
Natural Theology (1819). Many of their texts name and shame the materia-
lists and their connection with political revolution. According to the natu-
ral theologians (or »Paleyologists«), the exquisite adaptations of plants and
animals to their circumstances, and, conversely, of the circumstances to the
organism constituted compelling evidence of divine design. What is more,
the very fact of adaptation seemed to rule out the possibility of evolution-
ary change, for surely any transformation of a species and/or the world
could only lead to a disruption of their coordination, and hence »degener-
ation« rather than improvement (Whewell, 1846, p. 104; see also Richards,
1987, pp. 63-4, on Georges Cuvier).
Darwin’s own theory explained both adaptation in terms of transforma-
tion and, conversely, tranformation in terms of adaptation.2 The important
point for my present purposes is that Darwin introduced the concept of
adaptation into the discourse of natural science, and, in the process, under-
mined the dualism of subject and object at the heart of Cartesian mecha-
nistic science.
So much has happened since Darwin (not least the hijacking of Dar-
winism by standard reductionist science) that it is easy to forget the pro-
found impact his work initially had upon psychology. As his protégé,
George Romanes, suggested, this was in part precisely because »Mr. Dar-
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win was not only not himself a psychologist, but had little aptitude for, and
perhaps less sympathy with, the technique of psychological method.«:
The whole constitution of his mind was opposed to the subtlety of the
distinctions and the mysticism of the conceptions which this technique
so frequently involves; and therefore he was accustomed to regard the
problems of mind in the same broad and general light that he regard-
ed all the other problems of nature. (Romanes, 1882, pp. 65-66).
In addition to Darwin’s treatment of mind as inherent to the natural order
of things (Allen, 1983, Richards, 1987, Schweber, 1985; Smith, 1978),
there was the specific emphasis upon the fact of adaptation – the co-ordi-
nation – of organism and environment. Here is Dewey discussing the
impact of biological thinking on the »new psychology« just two years after
Darwin’s death:
We see that man is somewhat more than a neatly dovetailed psychical
machine who may be taken as an isolated individual, laid on the dis-
secting table of analysis and duly anatomized. ... To biology is due the
conception of organism. In psychology this conception has led to the
recognition of mental life as an organic unitary process developing
according to the laws of all life, and not a theatre for the exhibition of
independent faculties, or a rendezvous in which isolated sensations
and ideas may gather, hold external converse, and then forever part.
Along with this recognition of the solidarity of mental life has come
that of the relation in which it stands to other lives organized in soci-
ety. The idea of environment is a necessity to the idea of organism, and
with the conception of environment comes the possibility of consider-
ing psychical life as an individual, isolated thing developing in a va-
cuum. (Dewey, 1884, pp. 278 & 285; emphasis added).
A very similar stress upon the need to take the animal-environment relation
as the focus of study also occurs in the work of William James and George
Herbert Mead:
... since organism and environment determine one another and are
mutually dependent for their existence, it follows that the life-process,
to be adequately understood, must be considered in terms of their
interrelations. (Mead, 1934, p. 130).
The great fault of the older rational psychology was to set up the soul
as an absolute spiritual being with certain faculties of its own by
which the several activities of remembering, imagination, reasoning,
willing, etc., were explained, almost without reference to the peculia-
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rities of the world with which these activities deal. But the richer
insight of modern days perceives that our inner faculties are adapted
in advance to the features of the world in which we dwell, adapted, I
mean, so as to secure our safety and prosperity in its midst. ... Mind
and world in short have been evolved together, and in consequence
are something of a mutual fit. (James, 1892, p. 3-4; emphasis added.)
Of course, many different aspects of Darwin’s work have been appropriat-
ed (and misappropriated) by psychologists, within differential psychology,
eugenics and sociobiology, and developmental and comparative psycholo-
gy. So it is important to remember that Darwin himself conducted psycho-
logical research. He was not entirely the ‘old buffer’ portrayed in the text-
books, relying exclusively on anecdotal reports.
An important, but neglected, case in point is Darwin’s remarkable
research on the activities of the lowly earthworm, brought together in his
final book, The formation of vegetable mould, through the action of worms
with observations on their habits (Darwin, 1881). This seemingly minor,
even quaint, topic, meant a lot to Darwin. He conducted his studies of
earthworms over many years, and he was convinced that worms were
among the important species in the history of the earth in terms of their
widespread and radical impact upon the landscape (Ghilarov, 1983).
The studies relate to Darwin’s wider project in several ways. First, over
the course of many years, he carefully recorded the rate at which earth-
worms’ castings come to cover objects on the surface of the ground. Al-
though the process is, indeed, very slow, it was evident that earthworms
must have a profound impact, eventually burying very large structures
indeed. This, Darwin argued, was a demonstration of the more general point
that very gradual change can nevertheless lead to profound even radical
change of the kind he proposed selection could itself eventually achieve.
Second, he regarded the activity of the earthworms as essentially adap-
tive, and sought to determine, in relation to the ambient conditions, the bio-
logical significance of their drawing in of leaves (was it to maintain the
humidity or the temperature of their burrows?).
Thirdly, he carefully put the earthworms through their paces, by pre-
senting them with unfamiliar and tricky leaves (including artificial leaves
cut out of paper) to see how they coped. After all, it is far from an easy task
to drag a large leaf into a tight burrow. Yet the worms proved impressive-
ly flexible and astute, heading for the optimum part of the leaf. They are,
Darwin insisted, most definitely not the mechanical automatons of
Cartesian psychology:
They act in nearly the same manner as would a man, who had to close
a cylindrical tube with different kinds of leaves, petioles, triangles of
Darwin, Ecological Psychology and the Principle 
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paper, etc. For they commonly seize such objects by their pointed
ends. But with thin objects a certain number are drawn in by their
broader ends. They do not act in the same unvarying manner in all
cases, as do most of the lower animals; for instance, they do not drag
in leaves by their foot-stalks, unless the basal part of the blade is as
narrow as the apex, or narrower than it. (Darwin, 1881, p. 313; see
also Reed, 1982).
Finally, and most importantly, the example of earthworms and their ‘world’
should help us think differently about the relation between animal and
environment. For even within so-called ecological approaches to psychol-
ogy, it is easy to slip into a kind of environmental determinism, and treat
the environment as an ‘independent variable’, ultimately separable from
the animal in question. But animal and environment are interdependent,
and this is not just a question of logic or definition, but of history, »a mov-
ing, growing never finished process« (John Dewey, 1958, p. 295). Earth-
worms, through their collective activity, have both transformed and sus-
tained their circumstances. Earthworms and the vegetable mould sur-
rounding them have co-evolved. Vegetable mould did not exist before
earthworms. Their relation is mutual.
... in his Earthworms [Darwin’s] attention was drawn to that aspect of
ecology which at that time and still many years later was neglected by
ecologists. Ecology, according to its very definition, studies interac-
tion and interrelationships of organisms and their environments. Up to
a short time ago, ecologists only studied dependence of organisms on
their environment. Darwin in his Earthworms has shown brilliantly
the other side of the medal – the influence of organisms on their envi-
ronment, i.e. the dependence of the milieu, of the environment, on
their activity. (Ghilarov, 1983, pp. 3-4).
After Darwin
So what happened to this early mutualist or ‘ecological’ psychology? Well,
for a while it seems to have thrived. Far from the image of early psychol-
ogy as devoted exclusively to introspection, there was certainly a lively
interest in what people actually get up to. As Woodworth (1943, 49-50) has
stressed, a psychology of ‘conduct’ was established well before Watson’s
so-called behaviorist revolution. But this early psychology became
eclipsed for a number of reasons. At the beginning of the twentieth centu-
ry, Darwinism itself was widely regarded as discredited, and in vivo
research was displaced by the in vitro studies of the experimental physio-
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logists and anatomists. Psychology’s own agenda turned more to techno-
logical control rather than self-understanding (Danziger, 1979).
Linked to all this was the rise of behaviorism. Watson’s version of
behaviorism was essentially a return to Cartesian assumptions. The first of
these was the supposed logical disjunction between body and mind.
Behaviorism’s interest in ‘behaviour’ was primarily methodological rather
than substantive.3 Behavior mattered primarily because it could be
observed. Second, there was the restoration to a central position of the con-
ception of the body as a passive mechanism, or, in other words, stimulus-
response psychology (cf. Dewey, 1896).
Although in very obvious ways modern cognitivist psychology was a
reaction to mainstream behaviorism, it has also perpetuated much of the
kind of behaviorism it claims to have replaced (Costall & Still, 1991).
Again, the body has been assumed to be essentially passive or reactive, and
the task of theory to explain what mediates between ‘stimulus’ and
‘response’, or ‘input’ and ‘output’.4 And, again, there is the same commit-
ment to methodological behaviorism, and for the same dualistic reasons,
though this time round the theoretical focus is on the other side of this dual-
ism: the mind, rather than ‘mere’ behaviour. What people actually do is not
of interest to psychology:
To take behavior as the focus of attention for psychology is as big an
error as to take tracks in cloud chambers as the main object of study
in particle physics. Such tracks are interesting only as clues to the
existence of certain particles and to their properties. (Macnamara,
1999, p. 241; emphasis added).
Darwin, Ecological Psychology and the Principle 
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‘Ecological psychology’ and the principle of animal-environment
mutuality
A number of ecological psychologies have been established as a corrective
to the focus, within mainstream psychology, on mind as both disembodied
and abstracted from a wider ‘world’. I am thinking of the work of Egon
Brunswik (see Hammond & Stewart, 2001), Kurt Lewin (1951), Uri
Bronfenbrenner (1979), Roger Barker (1968), and James Gibson (1979).
There are interesting commonalities and differences among these theorists
(see Heft, 2001, for comparisons between Gibson, Barker, Lewin, and
Bronfenbrenner).
Gibson put a special emphasis on the mutuality of animal and environ-
ment, but, at the same, was wary of the ‘subjectivication’ of the environ-
ment. Here is Gibson’s statement of the mutuality principle:
The words animal and environment make an inseparable pair. Each
term implies the other. No animal could exist without an environment
surrounding it. Equally, although not so obvious, an environment
implies an animal (or at least an organism) to be surrounded. (Gibson,
1979, p. 8).
Two of Gibson’s concepts are more specific manifestations of this princi-
ple. The first is the concept of ‘affordances’:
»The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal,
what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford
is found in the dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. ... I mean by
it something that refers to both the environment and the animal in a
way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity of the
animal and the environment.« (Gibson, 1979, p. 127).
Affordances are actual properties of the environment, even though they are
animal dependent. Apples and, for that matter, grass, afford eating – they
constitute food – in relation to certain kinds of organism. If, for example,
ungulates and certain insects did not exist, grass would not ‘be’ food. The
concept of affordances, as Gibson left it, has many limitations (see Costall,
1995). Nevertheless, with this simple concept, Gibson, in effect, promised
to challenge the long-standing assumption within Western thought that
‘reality’ excludes us.
The second concept, »visual kinesthesis«, concerns our »awareness of
being the world« (Gibson, 1979, p. 239). This relates to his classic work on
»optic flow«, and »the awareness of movement or stasis, of starting and
stopping, of approaching or retreating, of going in one direction or another,
and of the imminence of an encounter« (Gibson, 1979, p. 236). Then there
Alan Costall480
02-Costall.qxd  06-12-01  10:41  Side 480
is the ‘visible horizon’ which corresponds to our eye level, and relates dis-
tant objects to our own bodies. For example, objects extending above the
visible horizon are higher than eye level (and the horizon sections equal
sized objects in equal proportions). As Gibson put it, the horizon »is
neither subjective nor objective; it expresses the reciprocity of observer
and environment« (Gibson, 1979, p. 164).
Furthermore, we can see our own bodies, not only our arms and legs
there in the world, but also our selves restricting our view:
»Ask yourself what it is that you see hiding the surroundings as you
look out on the world – not darkness, surely, not air, not nothing, but
the ego! (Gibson, 1979, p. 112).5
In short, Gibson provided some important resources for a mutualist
approach to psychology. And yet Gibson himself evidently felt uneasy with
the implications, the fear that relational thinking would degenerate into rel-
ativism (Costall, 1995; Costall & Still, 1989). We find in his own writings,
and in that of some of his students, the assertion that environments are not,
after all, animal-dependent (Gibson 1979, p. 129); that affordances are not
relational (Heft 2001, p. 125; Reed, 1993); and that information exists and
can be defined without reference to perceivers (Gibson, 1961; Reed, 1996,
p. 253). In reaction to the extreme subjectivism of standard psychological
accounts, Gibson so often reverted to its direct opposite (and, ultimately,
just the other side of the same coin):
Reading Gibson, one often gains the impression that his keen philo-
sophical criticism of idealism (and ‘subjectivism’) leads him ‘auto-
matically’ into the opposite camp, i.e. that of Realism. A philosophi-
cal argumentation in support of Realism, however, can hardly be
found. ... Ecological theory needs [a relational ontology] and should
not define and articulate its basic notions in terms of Idealism’s direct
opposite. (Tamboer & Heij, 1991, p. 18).
Ecological psychologies, of many kinds, find it so difficult to stay with the
principle of mutualism. But in the absence of relational thinking, of non-
disjunctive distinctions, dualisms necessarily persist: of subject and object,
of agent and world, and of the ‘intentional’ and the material. A retreat into
traditional realism entails the same old exclusion of us.
Darwin, Ecological Psychology and the Principle 
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